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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 981585-CA 
v. : 
KANDICE JEAN HATCH, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from jury convictions for burglary of a non-dwelling, a third 
degree felony; theft, a class A misdemeanor; and theft by deception, a class B 
misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-
3 (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly admit defendant's guilty pleas to two counts of 
felony forgery for impeachment purposes under rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules of 
Evidence? 
Defendant agreed at trial that the felony pleas were admissible for impeachment 
purposes. This issue is therefore affirmatively waived, and no standard of review applies. 
Defendant raised no objection to the prosecutor's opening statement below, nor did 
she seek any other relief. On appeal, she provides no citation to the record showing that 
her claims of prosecutorial misconduct were preserved below, nor does she allege any 
exception to the preservation rule. Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(A)(B). Therefore, these issues 
are not properly before the Court, and no standard of review applies. 
4. Do defendant's multiple and unsubstantiated claims of error require 
reversal of the jury verdict under the cumulative error doctrine? 
Whether the cumulative effect of individually harmless errors requires reversal 
turns on whether the errors as a whole undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. 
Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 350 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1995). 
5. Is the evidence sufficient to support the jury verdict? 
Defendant has not marshaled the supporting evidence on appeal; therefore, her 
claim of insufficient evidence is not properly before the Court. State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 
470, 473 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. App. P. 24: 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain . . . 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the 
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court. 
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Rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness 
may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but 
subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness^] 
Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,. 
. . (2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with burglary of a non-dwelling, theft, and theft by 
deception (R. 2-1).1 Following a jury trial on 11 March 1998, defendant was convicted as 
charged (R. 65, 67, 69). The trial court imposed the concurrent, statutory indeterminate 
terms of from zero to five years for burglary of a non-dwelling, one year for theft, and six 
months for theft by deception (R. 113-111). Defendant was also ordered to pay fines and 
restitution (id.). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On 15 March 1997, Bill Wilson discovered that his commercial storage unit had 
been burgled and among the items missing was an old saddle of primarily sentimental 
value. Four days later, on 19 March 1997, defendant, Wilson's former girlfriend, sold the 
saddle to a pawn shop for fifty dollars. 
*The pleadings volume is numbered in reverse chronological order. 
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Burglary 
Wilson rented the storage unit in August 1996 after he lost his house in bankruptcy 
proceedings (R. 58: 157).2 Wilson shared the storage unit with his former wife, Grace 
Sharp, whom he divorced in 1992, but with whom he had a friendly relationship (id). 
Following the divorce, Wilson and defendant had a romantic relationship from December 
1995 to July 1996, or until approximately one month before Wilson rented his storage 
unit (R. 58: 157-60, 173-74). Defendant did not have any personal property in Wilson's 
unit (id)? 
When Wilson visited his storage unit on 15 March 1997 to retrieve a washing 
machine for his daughter, he discovered that the hasp had been pried off and the unit had 
been burgled and vandalized (R. 58: 114-15, 156). Clothes were strewn about, boxes had 
been ripped into, and an entertainment center lay broken into pieces on the floor (R. 58: 
116). There were several items missing from the unit (R. 58: 156-57, 179-80). One of 
the items missing was Sharp's saddle, a cherished childhood heirloom (R. 58: 127-28, 
135, 158, 169, 181,268). 
2Citation to the transcript will be as (R. [record number]: [internal page number]). 
3Unbeknownst to Wilson, several months before he rented the unit, defendant's 
daughter had rented the storage unit next to his unit for the purpose of storing her 
mother's property (R. 58: 159). 
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Investigation 
Corporal Byron of the Uintah County Sheriffs Department investigated the 
burglary (R. 58: 114-15). Corporal Byron determined that there had been a forced entry 
into the unit (R. 58: 116). Based on the type of destruction in the unit, Corporal Byron 
believed that the burglary was not random, but was of a personal nature (R. 58: 124-25). 
When Corporal Byron asked Wilson who he thought might have broken into the unit, 
Wilson unhesitatingly named his ex-girlfriend, defendant, and her daughters (R. 58: 124-
26, 157-58, 160). This confirmed the corporal's hypothesis that the break-in was 
"personal" (R. 58: 124-26, 130-31). 
Four days after the discovery of the break-in, defendant sold Sharp's saddle to a 
pawn shop in Vernal (R. 58: 148, 152, 213, 233-34). Defendant executed a bill of sale 
and gave her name, thumbprint, and identification (R. 58: 152-53, 233-34). She also told 
the pawn shop employee that the saddle had been a gift (R. 58: 152-53). The pawn shop 
paid defendant $50 (R. 58: 148, 150-51, 213, 234). 
After police discovered the saddle at the pawn shop, defendant agreed to come in 
and be interviewed by Sergeant Hatzidakis, who assisted Corporal Byron in the burglary 
investigation (R. 58: 194, 196, 200). Defendant admitted she was the one who sold the 
saddle to the pawn shop (R. 58: 233-34). She also gave inconsistent statements during 
the interview: defendant first claimed that Wilson gave her the saddle outright, then she 
claimed that Wilson gave her the saddle to sell for him (R. 58: 196-97, 199). 
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Additionally, as the interview became more focused, defendant became agitated and 
disruptive (R. 58: 200). She began to scream and yell (id). Sgt. Hatzidakis terminated 
the interview at this point, sensing that any further inquiry would be unproductive (id). 
Sgt. Hatzidakis thought that defendant was trying to turn the focus away from the 
interrogation by her erratic behavior (R. 58: 206). 
Defense 
At trial, defendant's daughter testified that she was present with others when 
Wilson allegedly dropped the saddle off at defendant's home (R. 58: 211).4 
Joe King, a family friend, testified that he saw the saddle on the floor of the 
defendant's trailer (R. 58: 221). However, King did not remember when he saw the 
saddle in the trailer; moreover, he was not present when Wilson allegedly dropped the 
saddle off (R. 58: 221, 222). Rather, defendant and her daughters told King that 
defendant had done so (R. 58: 222). By the time of trial, Joe had discussed the story that 
defendant and her daughters told him about Wilson and the saddle several times (R. 58: 
222). Defendant in particular "helped"King with his testimony (R. 58: 256-57). 
Defendant also testified, acknowledging that she was upset with Wilson and felt 
that he was in part responsible for her children becoming involved with social services 
(R. 58: 165-66,203, 225, 231, 255-56). Defendant claimed that she went to New Mexico 
4Defendant represented that she was unable to contact the friends who were 
present to testify (R. 58: 211). 
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with the understanding that Wilson would care for her daughters in her absence (R. 58: 
224). Defendant informed jurors that she had been "in jail" (id). However, Wilson did 
not take care of her daughters and, as a consequence, social services became involved (R. 
58: 225). Defendant further testified that after she "got out" and returned to Vernal from 
New Mexico, she tried to get in touch with her "PO" or probation/parole officer (R. 58: 
226). 
In addition to causing problems for her daughters, defendant claimed that Wilson 
held some of her belongings and would not return them (R. 58: 161, 173-74, 203, 229-30, 
231, 258). Accordingly, after returning from New Mexico, defendant began to look for 
her dispersed property and traveled to Craig, Colorado, where Wilson was then living (R. 
58: 226). Defendant threatened Wilson that if he did not return her property she would 
file charges against him (R. 58: 229). 
Defendant claimed that after she returned home to Vernal, Wilson brought her the 
saddle to make amends for all the trouble he had caused (R. 58: 231-32). Defendant was 
not sure when Wilson brought the saddle, but speculated that it was March 14th or 15th (R. 
58: 259). A few days later, defendant took the saddle to the pawn shop and sold it (R. 
58: 233-34). Defendant discussed her testimony with her daughters and her attorney four 
or five times (R. 58:256). 
On cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor brought out that defendant had 
pled guilty to two counts of felony forgery a few days before trial (R. 58: 252-53). 
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Defendant denied, however, having dealt with Sgt. Hatzidakis on any more than two prior 
occasions, including the instant burglary (R. 58: 254-55). 
The State called Sgt. Hatzidakis as a rebuttal witness and elicited two pieces of 
information that went to defendant's veracity: First, that defendant's assertion that she 
had dealt with the sergeant on two prior occasions was "very inaccurate" as he had "dealt 
with her numerous, numerous times" over the past "twelve years"; and second, that 
defendant's reputation in the community was for being "untruthful[] or deceptive" (R. 58: 
260, 262-63). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant affirmatively waived her claim of error with regard to the 
admission of her felony pleas for impeachment purposes under rule 609(a), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
Point 11(A). The trial court sua sponte precluded Sgt. Hatzidakis from testifying 
as to the conclusion he drew from the fact of defendant's inconsistent statements; 
therefore, defendant's claim of unfavorable error under rule 608(a), Utah Rules of 
Evidence is not supported in the record. 
Point 11(B). Defendant's complaint that Sgt. Hatzidakis was allowed to testify on 
rebuttal that her testimony regarding her number of contacts with him was inaccurate is 
unpreserved, as is her complaint that the sergeant's further rebuttal testimony failed to 
establish that her reputation for untruthfulness existed at the time of trial. As defendant 
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argues no exception to the preservation rule, these claims are not properly before the 
Court. 
Point 11(C). Although defendant objected on foundation grounds to the sergeant's 
testimony that she had a reputation for untruthfulness in the community, the trial court 
properly overruled the objection based on Sgt. Hatzidakis's testimony that he had lived in 
the community for 12 years, during which time he had numerous contacts with defendant. 
Point H(D). Defendant's complaint that the prosecutor misrepresented Sgt. 
Hatzidakis's testimony in his closing argument when he argued that defendant had a 
reputation for untruthfulness in the community is unpreserved. As defendant argues no 
exception to the preservation rule, this claim is not properly before the Court. 
Point III. Defendant's claim that the prosecutor improperly asserted his personal 
knowledge of the case during his opening statement is unpreserved. As defendant argues 
no exception to the preservation rule, defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct is 
not properly before the Court. 
Point IV. Defendant fails to establish any error in the record; therefore, her claim 
of cumulative error necessarily fails. 
Point V. Defendant fails to marshal the evidence supporting the jury verdict and 
to demonstrate that, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is 
insufficient. Her sufficiency challenge should therefore be rejected. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HER GUILTY PLEAS TO TWO 
COUNTS OF FELONY FORGERY WERE IMPROPERLY 
ADMITTED FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES UNDER RULE 
609(a)(2), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, IS UNPRESERVED 
In Point I of her brief, defendant challenges the admission of her guilty pleas to 
two counts of felony forgery for impeachment purposes under rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Defendant does not dispute that her pleas to felony forgery involved 
dishonesty or false statement as required by rule 609(a)(2), but rather that the guilty pleas 
themselves did not amount to convictions for purposes of the impeachment rule. Aplt. 
Br. at 13. It is undisputed, however, that defendant did not raise this particular objection 
below, when the trial court determined that the prosecutor could elicit the felony pleas on 
cross-examination under rule 609(a)(2). See Aplt. Br. at 11, 16. Therefore, this issue is 
unpreserved. 
A. Proceedings Below 
Following defendant's testimony on direct, the trial court sua sponte called counsel 
in chambers to "to go over whatever the parties want to get into as to the record, criminal 
record of the defendant. And I do that because if it's not admissible, I don't want to 
prejudice the jury" (R. 58: 236) (copies of the pertinent transcript pages are contained in 
addendum A). The prosecutor indicated that his cross-examination of defendant would 
12 
include questions regarding her previous incarceration in New Mexico (R. 58: 237-38), 
add. A, as well as her local crimes involving dishonesty: a prior shoplifting conviction 
and her recent guilty pleas to two counts of felony forgery (R. 58: 238), add. A. The 
prosecutor opined that these inquiries were proper under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (R. 58: 239), add. A. The trial court disagreed that the prosecutor's proffered 
questions were permissible under rule 404(b) and would not allow the prosecutor to 
inquire regarding the shoplifting conviction, or an earlier comment defendant had made 
regarding her parole officer (R. 58: 242-43), add. A. However, the trial court indicated 
that it would allow the prosecutor to ask about the felony forgeries under rule 609(a)(2) 
(R. 58: 240, 244), add. A. In so ruling, the trial court admonished the prosecutor not to 
unduly emphasize the forgeries: "[Y]ou are entitled to ask . . . if she's plead or found 
guilty and what she pled to and then not go into the facts" (R. 58: 244), add. A. Defense 
counsel agreed that the prosecutor's inquiry into the felony forgeries should be so limited 
(R. 58: 245-48), add. A. Defense counsel then instructed defendant that when the 
prosecutor asked about the forgeries she was to simply admit them (R. 58: 248), add. A. 
The prosecutor subsequently elicited evidence of the felony forgeries as follows: 
PROSECUTOR: Have you ever been convicted of a crime involving 
facilitating a fraud or making, completing, executing, 
authenticating, issuing transferring, publishing, or uttering 
any writing so that the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purported to be the act of another, specifically, to wit, a 
number of bank checks issued on another person's account? 
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DEFENDANT: Yes. I plead guilty on two counts, forgery. 
PROSECUTOR: And those are felony forgeries, and that was within the last 
few days? Few weeks? 
DEFENDANT: About a week ago, I think. 
(R. 58: 253), add. A. Thereafter, the prosecutor moved, without objection, to admit 
Exhibit 3, a copy of the plea agreement (id). The Judgement and Order of Commitment 
involving defendant's guilty pleas to felony forgery was entered on 11 August 1998, 
approximately five months after the guilty pleas were admitted at the instant trial (Supp. 
R. 142-140) (a copy is contained in addendum B). 
B. Affirmative Waiver 
For the first time on appeal, defendant complains that her pleas to felony forgery 
were improperly admitted because she had not yet been sentenced on the pleas at the time 
they were used to impeach her testimony. Aplt. Br. at 13. It is undisputed that defendant 
failed to raise this objection below. Aplt. Br. at 12, 16. Indeed, defendant acknowledges 
defense counsel participated in the allegedly erroneous ruling. Aplt. at 13. As 
demonstrated above, defense counsel agreed that the felony pleas were admissible, but 
that the prosecutor's examination of the pleas should be narrowly limited to their 
existence and nothing more (R. 58: 245-48), add. A. Therefore, any objection to the 
admission of the felony pleas on appeal has been affirmatively waived. See State v. 
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 269 (Utah 1998). 
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Given the clear waiver here, defendant cannot present this issue for the first time 
on appeal unless she persuades the Court that the trial court committed "plain error or that 
there are other exceptional circumstances." State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 
App. 1992). Here, however, defendant does not argue any exception to the preservation 
requirement in her opening brief; therefore, her claim is not subject to review. State v. 
Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 
(Utah 1995). See State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 n.8 (Utah App. 1995) 
(recognizing "well settled rule" that the court will not consider issues raised for the first 
time in a reply brief," including issues of plain error or exceptional circumstances), cert, 
denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). 
C. No Unfair Prejudice 
Even assuming defendant both properly presented her claim on appeal, and that it 
was error to impeach defendant with the forgery pleas at the time of trial, defendant 
ultimately suffered no unfair prejudice because her pleas have since become convictions. 
As acknowledged by defendant, the Judgement and Order of Commitment regarding the 
guilty pleas was ultimately entered on 11 August 1998 (Supp. R. 142-140), add. B. See 
Aplt. Br. at 11 n. 2. Under this circumstance, reversing defendant's conviction would ill-
serve the policy behind differentiating a guilty plea and a conviction for purposes of rule 
609(a)(2). 
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In State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292 (Utah app. 1990), the Court was concerned that a 
guilty plea could be withdrawn prior to the imposition of sentence, and therefore the 
Court commented in dicta, that a guilty plea was not fairly equated with the finality of a 
conviction for purposes of impeachment under rule 609(a)(2). Morrell, 803 P.2d at 294 
n. 2. Here, however, defendant's guilty pleas were not withdrawn prior to sentencing: 
defendant was in fact sentenced and convicted. See Aplt. Br., add. B. Thus, the jury 
received no information regarding defendant's veracity that it was not ultimately entitled 
to receive under rule 609(a)(2). 
In claiming otherwise, defendant seeks a "windfall" based on a mere accident of 
timing. Such is insufficient to establish prejudice. Indeed, in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 
U.S. 364 (1993), the United States Supreme Court rejected a similar claim of prejudice in 
an ineffective assistance analysis. Trial counsel in Fretwell failed to make an objection in 
the sentencing proceeding that would have been supported by a decision which 
subsequently was overruled. Id. at 366. Due to the change in the law, the result in 
Fretwell was "rendered neither unreliable nor fundamentally unfair as a result of 
counsel's failure to make the objection." Id. On that basis, the Supreme Court concluded 
that no prejudice had occurred, and that to hold otherwise, "would grant criminal 
defendants a windfall to which they are not entitled/' Id. 
Here, defendant's prejudice claim fails for the same reason the prejudice claim in 
Fretwell failed - it is based on a "windfall"to which defendant is not entitled. In light of 
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the policy concern expressed in Morrell, the admission of the pleas, now convictions, 
does not render the jury verdict unreliable or fundamentally unfair. See State v. Verde\ 
770 P.2d 116, 124 n. 15 (Utah 1989) (recognizing symmetry of prejudice requirement 
under plain error and ineffective assistance analysis). See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (same). Defendant's claim of prejudice should therefore be 
rejected. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY ELICITED AND ARGUED 
REPUTATION EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 608(a), UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE 
In Point II of her brief, defendant raises multiple claims of error regarding the 
prosecutor's elicitation of negative veracity evidence in alleged violation of rule 608(a), 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Br. at 19-20. As will be demonstrated below, defendant 
fails to demonstrate that the trial court ruled unfavorably below, or that her claims are 
preserved or otherwise merit appellate review. 
A. No Improper Veracity Evidence Was Admitted During the 
Prosecutor's Direct Examination of Sgt Hatzidakis 
First, defendant asserts that the prosecutor elicited improper veracity testimony 
from Sgt. Hatzidakis during the State's case-in-chief. Aplt. Br. at 19-20. In so arguing, 
however, defendant fails to acknowledge that the trial court ruled in her favor below. 
Specifically, on direct examination of Sgt. Hatzidakis the prosecutor tried to elicit how 
17 
the sergeant determined a suspect's veracity in an interview situation (R. 58: 198) (the 
pertinent transcript pages are contained in addendum C). The prosecutor asked what it 
suggested to Sergeant Hatzidakis "when you get an a, b, or c, a gut to tell for somebody 
that somebody gave it to me then somebody gave it, pawn it store it for you?" (id.). The 
trial court sua sponte interjected that the prosecutor was "asking (the sergeant) to evaluate 
on and comment on the truthfulness of the statement. He's not qualified to do that" (id.). 
Defense counsel concurred in the trial court's observation (id.). The prosecutor restated 
his question and the proceedings continued as follows: 
PROSECUTOR: Would you find it to be an 
indicator of accuracy and 
veracity to have 
inconsistent statements 
offered to you? 
SGT. HATZIDAKIS: I am sorry. One more time. 
PROSECUTOR: Would you find it - would 
it suggest to you that a 
person is being truthful 
when they gave you 
inconsistent statements? 
SGT. HATZIDAKIS: I would not believe -
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I still object. 
COURT: Sustained. 
TRIAL COUNSEL: Form of the question, Your Honor. 
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COURT: He's not going to be 
qualified to say whether or 
not this -
PROSECUTOR: I am not asking as an 
expert. I thought I made 
that plain in the foundation. 
But just in the thousands of 
interviews, just when 
people who change their 
story is likely to be truthful 
or not truthful. 
COURT: He's not qualified. Sorry. 
SGT. HATZIDAKIS: I understand. 
PROSECUTOR: In this case, however, you 
were given inconsistent 
statements; is that true? 
SGT. HATZIDAKIS: I was given inconsistent 
stories as to this particular 
case. 
PROSECUTOR: Thank you. 
(R. 58: 198-99), add. C. Trial counsel raised no further objection to the sergeant's 
testimony. 
Notwithstanding the above, defendant asserts that the prosecutor succeeded in 
eliciting improper veracity testimony from Sgt. Hatzidakis, and that the trial court erred in 
failing to cure the alleged error. Aplt. Br. at 19-20 (citing Harmon, 956 P.2d at 271, for 
the proposition that "one witness may not testify as to the credibility of statements made 
by another person on a particular occasion"). As is demonstrated by the above record 
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excerpt, however, the trial court sua sponte precluded the sergeant from testifying as to 
either specifically or generally, what conclusion he drew from defendant's inconsistent 
statements (R. 58: 198-99), add. C. Having failed to demonstrate that any arguably 
improper testimony was admitted, defendant's claim collapses of its own weight and 
should be rejected on that ground.5 
B. Defendant's Claims Regarding Sgt. Hatzidakis's Rebuttal Testimony 
Are Unpreserved and Otherwise Lack Merit 
Second, defendant complains about Sgt. Hatzidakis's rebuttal testimony to the 
effect that 1) defendant's claim of limited dealings with him was "[v]ery inaccurate," and 
2) that she had a reputation for being untruthful and/or deceptive (R. 58: 260, 263) 
(copies of the pertinent transcript pages are contained in addendum D). Aplt. Br. at 20-
21. As to the former, on cross-examination defendant denied having dealt with the 
sergeant on any more than two prior occasions, including the instant burglary (R. 58: 254-
55), add. D. The prosecutor called Sgt. Hatzidakis as a rebuttal witness to refute 
defendant's claim and elicited information that the sergeant had lived in Vernal for 12 
years, where he had also been employed in law enforcement (id). The prosecutor then 
inquired of the sergeant, "you just heard the defendant testify that she's only dealt with 
5In any event, because the prosecutor rephrased his initial question and focused 
instead on the sergeant's opinion as to the meaning of inconsistent statements in general, 
rather than as to defendant's particular inconsistent statements in this case, the question 
was ultimately, arguably consistent with rule 608(a). Cf. State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 
388, 393 (Utah 1989) (holding that rule 608(a)(1) bars admission of an expert's testimony 
as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion). 
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you on two occasions over those 12 years that you have been here in town. Would you 
please tell the jury whether that's accurate or not?" (R. 58: 260), add. D. The sergeant 
responded that defendant's testimony was, "Very inaccurate" (id). Indeed, the sergeant 
testified that he had "dealt with [defendant] numerous, numerous times," "over the entire 
12 years" (id.). 
Having established this foundation for the sergeant's opinion, the prosecutor asked 
Sgt. Hatzidakis if he knew whether defendant had a "reputation in this community for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness?" (R. 58: 260-61), add. D. Sgt. Hatzidakis responded 
affirmatively (id.). Trial counsel objected "with reference to [the sergeant's] knowledge, 
as to whether or not he is specifically going into any particular area that would be 
necessarily helpful to this jury, I don't think, with reference to that without something 
more than just the fact that they had had meetings or confrontations or whatever for 
whatever reason." (R. 58: 261), add. D. The prosecutor responded that rule 608(a) 
precluded his asking for specific instances, and that his question to the officer had tracked 
the language of the rule (id.). The trial court nevertheless sustained the objection "on this 
basis, that the issue is his knowledge of the witness' reputation in the community, not 
among law enforcement, but in the community at large" (R. 58: 261-262), add. D. The 
prosecutor rephrased the question and the.examination continued as follows: 
PROSECUTOR: Whether in the course of your 
dealings, not only with your 
officers, but other people that 
have been, and again without 
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disclosing circumstances, other 
people who have been involved in 
those situations with the 
defendant? 
TRIAL COUNSEL: I object to that. 
COURT: Sustained. The issue . . . is not 
with respect to any particular area, 
investigations or non-
investigations, just is he familiar 
with the reputation of this 
person's - excuse me - is he 
familiar with this person's 
reputation in the community with 
respect to honesty. That's all. 
PROSECUTOR: What I am trying to do is lay the 
foundation for his ability to give 
that. 
COURT: But it doesn't relate to 
investigations at all. See, leave 
that out of your question, I think 
we'll be all right. 
PROSECUTOR: Are you aware of whether or not 
the defendant has a reputation for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness? 
SGT. HATZIDAKIS: Yes. 
PROSECUTOR: 
TRIAL COUNSEL: 
What is that reputation? 
I think I object on the same basis. 
I still don't think there is a proper 
foundation with reference to the 
community at large. 
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COURT: Overruled. I think that that's -
you can cross-examine him on the 
issue. Overruled. 
PROSECUTOR: What is her reputation? 
SGT. HATZIDAKIS: I think it would be more towards 
the untruthfulness or deceptive. 
(R. 58: 262-63), add. D. 
In claiming error as to the sergeant's characterization of her testimony as "[vjery 
inaccurate," defendant fails to acknowledge that no objection was made to the sergeant's 
testimony below and that the issue is therefore unpreserved. See Aplt. Br. at 21. See also 
Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 917. As defendant argues no exception to the preservation rule in 
her opening brief, her claim is not subject to review. Johnson, 174 P.2d at 1144-45; 
Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5; Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 700 n.8.6 
In regards to defendant's challenge to the sergeant's additional rebuttal testimony, 
that defendant had a reputation for untruthfulness and deception, it is also unpreserved. 
Specifically, defendant claims that the prosecutor failed to elicit testimony from the 
6Even if the Court were to overlook defendant's failure to preserve this issue, it is 
also inadequately briefed. Defendant cites no authority that the sergeant's personal 
knowledge and experience constitutes improper veracity testimony under rule 608(a), and 
the State is aware of no such authority. Cf. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 392 (holding that rule 
608(a) bars admission of an expert's opinion as to the truthfulness of a witness on a 
particular occasion). Therefore, the claim can be rejected on the additional ground that it 
fails to comply with the briefing rule. See Utah R. App. P. 24(9); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 
247, 249 (Utah App. 1992) (declining to reach merits of an issue in part, due to appellants 
failure to "demonstrate 'under applicable authorities" why the claimed error necessitated 
reversal). 
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sergeant that defendant's reputation for untruthfulness existed at the time of trial Aplt. 
Br. at 21-22. Defendant, however, failed to raise this particular objection in the trial court 
(R. 58: 260-63), add. D. Because defendant argues no exception to the preservation 
requirement in her opening brief, this issue is waived. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 917; 
Johnson, 11A P.2d at 1144-45; Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5; Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 700 
n.8.7 
C. The Prosecutor Established Adequate Foundation for Sergeant 
Hatzidakis's Reputation Evidence 
Third, defendant cursorily claims that the prosecutor failed to lay adequate 
foundation for Sgt. Hatzidakis's testimony that defendant had a reputation for 
untruthfulness and deception. Aplt. Br. at 22. The prosecutor established, however, that 
the sergeant had lived in the community for 12 years and that through his career in law 
enforcement and otherwise, had "numerous contacts" with defendant "over the entire 12 
years" (R. 58: 259-60), add. D. The trial court accordingly overruled trial counsel's 
7Even if the Court were to overlook defendant's failure to preserve this claim, 
defendant cites only one non-controlling authority for the erroneous proposition that 
"reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness must be established at the time of trial." 
Aplt. Br. at 22 (citing United States v. Null, 415 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1969)). Contrary to 
defendant's representation, Null recognizes the general rule that reputation evidence must 
be confined to reputation at the time of the crime; however, it is within the discretion of 
the trial court to admit current reputation evidence under unique circumstances. Id. at 
1180. Null does not therefore mandate that a witness's reputation for veracity must be 
demonstrated to exist at the time of trial. Id. Indeed, the State is aware of no such 
requirement under rule 608(a). See EDWARD L. KIMBALL & RONALD N. BOYCE, UTAH 
EVIDENCE LAW (1996). 
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objection to the sergeant's testimony (R. 58: 263), add. D. Trial counsel did not request 
an opportunity to voir dire the sergeant (id). 
On appeal, defendant cites no authority that this foundation is inadequate for 
purposes of rule 608(a), and the State is aware of none. See, e.g., United States v. Nace, 
561 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1977) (adequate foundation for rule 608(a) testimony 
established where reputation witnesses had lived in same community as defendant for 8 
and 25 years). Defendant's claim should therefore be rejected. 
D. Defendant Misrepresents the Prosecutor's Closing Argument and Also 
Failed to Preserve any Objection Thereto8 
Finally, defendant erroneously claims that Sgt. Hatzidakis testified only as to his 
personal opinion of defendant's veracity, and not as to her reputation for truth and 
veracity in the community. Aplt. Br. at 23. Defendant therefore suggests the prosecutor's 
closing argument that defendant had a reputation for untruthfulness in the community 
misrepresented the sergeant's testimony. Id. To the extent defendant is suggesting that 
the alleged misrepresentation amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, her challenge fails. 
First, defendant raised no challenge to the prosecutor's closing argument below (R. 58: 
280) (a copy of the argument is contained in addendum E). Because defendant argues no 
exception to the preservation requirement in her opening brief, this issue is not preserved 
defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct in the opening statement are 
addressed in Point III of this brief. 
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for review on appeal. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 917; Johnson, 11A P.2d at 1144-45; 
Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5; Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 700 n.8. 
Second, even if the Court were to overlook defendant's failure to preserve her 
claim, no error occurred. As demonstrated in Point 11(B), the prosecutor elicited and the 
sergeant in fact testified as to defendant's reputation in the community (R. 58: 261-63), 
add. D. Therefore, the prosecutor did not misrepresent the sergeant's testimony in his 
closing argument when he asserted that defendant had a "reputation in town for 
untruthfulness" (R. 58: 280), add. E. Defendant's frivolous claim to the contrary should 
be rejected. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF MISCONDUCT IN THE 
PROSECUTOR'S OPENING STATEMENT ARE UNPRESERVED 
AND ALSO LACK MERIT 
In Point III of her brief, defendant claims that the prosecutor's opening statement 
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because he allegedly "asserted personal knowledge 
and belief about disputed facts including defendant's guilt." Aplt. Br. at 25. Defendant 
did not object to the prosecutor's opening statement below, nor did she ask for a curative 
instruction. On appeal, she argues no exception to the preservation rule in her opening 
brief. Id. Her claim of prosecutorial misconduct in the opening statement is therefore 
waived. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 917; Johnson, 11A P.2d at 1144-45; Pledger, 896 P.2d at 
1229 n.5; Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 700 n.8. 
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Even if the court were to overlook defendant's failure to properly preserve her 
claim, defendant fails to demonstrate that absent the prosecutor's statements, there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a different result. State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah 
App. 1998). 
Specifically, defendant complains about two statements in the prosecutor's 
opening. See Aplt. Br. at 27: 
1) "And after the case is over, the best thing here today is, I am going to be 
able to give Grace her saddle back" (R. 58: 108) (a complete copy of the 
prosecutor's opening statement is contained in addendum F of the State's 
brief); 
2) "But you are here to do one thing, and that's to find the truth. And the truth 
is this defendant got mad, she tore up Bill Wilson's storage shed, busted up 
his entertainment center. She took the saddle. . . . Saddle went down to 
Jiffy Pawn. Jiffy Pawn made out the money. They are out the money. 
Grace is out the saddle. And the defendant is here today to answer for it" 
(R. 58: 109), add. F. 
Defendant claims that these statements "unfairly exploit the prosecutor's standing and 
prestige with the jury," and also "imply that the prosecutor ha[d] access to information 
outside the record that supports his assertions" as to defendant's guilt. Aplt. Br. at 27-28. 
It is generally accepted that an opening statement should be an unargumentative 
overview of the facts the party tends to prove. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1254 
(Utah 1988) (discussing State v. Williams] 656 P.2d 450 (Utah 1982)), habeas corpus 
granted, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). The prosecutor's statements 
here may well lean more towards argument than an evidentiary overview. However, the 
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prosecutor's opening statement was not so troublesome as to evoke an objection or other 
request for relief from defense counsel. 
Moreover, the jurors did not hear anything in the prosecutor's opening statement 
that they would not have ultimately been entitled to hear in closing argument. See State v. 
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989) (noting the wide latitude of counsel in closing 
argument to "discuss fully from their standpoints the evidence and the inferences and 
deductions therefrom"). While the prosecutor's statements might have been more 
circumspect, the prosecutor essentially drew deductions from the evidence to be presented 
and predicted what the jury would ultimately find. As such, it is "unlikely that the jury 
considered the statements to be factual testimony from the prosecutor-the evil to be 
guarded against[.]" Id. This is particularly true where the trial court admonished the jury 
before opening statements that anything that the attorneys said was not evidence (R. 58: 
87, 89) (copies of the pertinent transcript pages are contained in addendum F). A jury 
instruction to the same effect was also given (R. 73) (Jury Instruction #20) (a copy is 
contained in addendum H). Such instructions have been held to cure any improper 
statements in the prosecutor's opening. Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1284 (declining to find error 
where jury was instructed to not to regard counsels' statements as evidence); Harmon, 
956 P.2d at 277 (Utah 1998) (same). Defendant therefore fails to demonstrate that the 
prosecutor's opening statement "call[ed] to the attention of the jury a matter it would not 
be justified in considering in determining its verdict[,]" let alone any prejudicial error. 
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State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 7509 754 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 923 P.23d 693 (Utah 
1996).9 Defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct should be rejected. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL 
In Point IV of her brief, defendant argues that the cumulative error doctrine should 
be applied here. Aplt. Br. at 29-31. Under that doctrine, even though errors may not 
individually warrant reversal, this Court may still reverse where the errors cumulatively 
undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 350 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). However, for the reasons already argued, 
defendant fails to demonstrate any error occurred; therefore, the Court need not consider 
whether the cumulative effect of these actions undermines confidence in the outcome. Cf. 
9To the extent defendant incorporates her claims of evidentiary error in Points I-II 
of her brief into her claim of prosecutorial misconduct in Point III of her brief, see Aplt. 
Br. at 25, her claim lacks merit for the reasons articulated in Points I-II of this brief. 
Insofar as defendant notes that the prosecutor included in his opening, the 
statement that Sgt. Hatzidakis "'didn't think he could believe [defendant] simply because 
she was telling a shifting story,"9 Aplt. Br. at 19 (quoting R. 58: 108), add. E, this 
statement did not accurately reflect the evidence ultimately adduced. As set out in Point 
II of this brief, trial counsel succeeded in precluding the sergeant's testimony that 
defendant's shifting explanations caused him to believe that she was lying. However, as 
noted in the body of this point, the sergeant did testify that defendant's stories were 
shifting and based on that testimony, the prosecutor could have argued in his closing that 
defendant's shifting explanations reasonably suggested that she was lying. Parsons, 781 
P.2d at 1284. Therefore, the inference that defendant was a liar was properly before the 
jury in any event. Defendant thus fails to demonstrate that the prosecutor's statement 
undermines confidence in the trial outcome. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1254-55 (minor 
discrepancy between opening statement and facts adduced held not to constitute 
prejudicial error). 
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id. at 350 (finding that the trial record contained numerous, individually harmless errors 
before concluding that the cumulative effect undermined confidence in the outcome). 
POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY 
VERDICT 
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict her for burglary of 
a non-dwelling, theft and theft by deception. Aplt. Br. at 31-33. Specifically, defendant 
complains that there was no direct evidence that she burgled Wilson's storage shed, and 
that the case therefore involved essentially a credibility contest between herself and 
Wilson. Id. Defendant maintains that absent the veracity evidence that she had 
committed two previous crimes involving dishonesty, that she appeared to be lying during 
her interview with Sgt. Hatzidakis, and that she had a reputation for untruthfulness in the 
community, "[t]he jury would have had a much more difficult even impossible time 
deciding whether Wilson or [defendant] was telling the truth." Aplt. Br. at 32. 
Defendant's sufficiency challenge fails for several reasons, the first of which is her 
failure to marshal the supporting evidence and, viewing it in the light most favorable to 
the jury verdict, demonstrate its inadequacy. State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah 
App. 1990). Her claim of insufficient evidence may rejected on this ground alone. State 
v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991) (finding it would be inappropriate to entertain 
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the merits of defendant's sufficiency challenge where defendant failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting the jury verdict). 
In any event, defendant's insufficiency claim lacks merit. For reasons set forth in 
Points I-III of this brief, the veracity evidence of which defendant complains was properly 
admitted here. Therefore, defendant's claim of insufficiency necessarily rests solely on 
the lack of direct evidence that she burgled Wilson's storage shed. However, there is 
abundant circumstantial evidence pointing to defendant as the culprit. 
In reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence claim, an appellate court views "'the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) 
(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)); State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 
545 (Utah 1994)). The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence or assess witness 
credibility, but assumes that "the jury believed the evidence and inferences that support 
the verdict." State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993). Evidence is sufficient only 
when so viewed, it is sufficiently inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the charged crime. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah 1991). 
When viewed in the foregoing light, the following circumstantial evidence 
presented at trial was more than sufficient for the jury to find that defendant burgled 
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Wilson's storage shed, stole Sharp's saddle from therein, and sold it to Jiffy Pawn for 
$50.00: 
• Upon discovery, Wilson immediately reported the burglary of his storage 
shed, and the theft of his former wife's saddle, on 15 March 1997. The 
investigating officer observed that the burglary appeared to have been 
committed by someone that knew Wilson, and was of a personal nature. 
None of the nearby sheds, including defendant's shed, had been burgled (R. 
58: 114-16, 124-28, 130-31, 135, 156-159, 169, 181,268) 
• When so informed, Wilson unhesitatingly suggested defendant and her 
daughters as the potential culprits (R. 58: 124-26, 157-58, 160). 
• Four days after the burglary was reported, defendant sold Sharp's saddle to a 
local pawn shop for $50 (R. 58: 148, 150-52, 213, 233-34). 
• While defendant had previously had a romantic relationship with Wilson, it 
had turned acrimonious by the time of the burglary. Defendant blamed 
defendant for her daughters becoming involved with social services while 
she served time in New Mexico. Defendant also claimed that defendant 
failed to return much of her personal property and she threatened to file 
charges against him (R. 58: 161, 165-66, 173-74, 203, 224-26, 229-31, 255-
58). 
• Defendant's daughter testified that she was present when Wilson dropped 
the saddle off; however, defendant was unable to contact other friends that 
she claimed were also present. Defendant's daughter, and a friend who 
testified that he saw the saddle at defendant's home, rehearsed their 
testimony with defendant (R. 58: 211, 222, 256). 
• Wilson and Sharp both testified that neither had given the saddle to 
defendant nor authorized her to sell it (R. 58: 162-63, 182-83). 
Taken together, the above evidence sufficiently supports defendant's convictions for the 
instant burglary and theft crimes, even absent the properly admitted veracity evidence 
discussed in Points I-III, supra, and absent direct evidence of defendant's involvement. It 
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was simply within the province of the jury to determine whether to believe defendant or 
Wilson and Sharp. State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 791 (Utah 1984). As stated, it is 
presumed on appeal that the jury believed that evidence which supports its verdict. State 
v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah App. 1990). Here, where defendant was found in 
possession of recently stolen property of little more than sentimental value to its owner, 
her explanation that it was given to her as repayment for wrongs done to her lacks 
credibility. The jury reasonably rejected defendant's story and her sufficiency challenge 
should be similarly dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's jury convictions for burglary of a non-dwelling, theft, and theft by 
deception should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on2/September 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
1 would like to talk to you folks about in chambers. 
2 And I do have a telephone call that I am expecting. 
3 Would you like to step down, please. 
4 Can I see you gentlemen for a few minutes in 
5 chambers. Court will be in recess. 
6 (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.) 
7 MR. WALLENTINE: Okay. 
8 THE COURT: We are in chambers, and at the 
9 court's request, I am going to go over whatever the 
10 parties want to get into as to the record, criminal 
11 record of the defendant. And I do that because if 
12 it's not admissible, I don't want to prejudice the 
13 jury. 
14 MR. BEASLIN: I agree. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Wallentine, what would you 
16 like to get in? 
17 MR. WALLENTINE: I intend to ask her 
18 questions about her ability to drive back and forth 
19 from New Mexico. I intend to ask her what she meant 
20 and why she thought it was important to tell the jury 
21 about a conversation with her parole officer. 
22 MR. BEASLIN: She had a report when she got 
23 back. 
24 MR. WALLENTINE: I don't know that. 
25 MR. BEASLIN: The P.O. just slipped out. 
1 MR. WALLENTINE: Perhaps she thinks it has 
2 some relevance to the case. 
3 MR. BEASLIN: I don't think it had any 
4 relevance. She was ordered to report. That's all she 
5 did. 
6 MR. WALLENTINE: Your opinion of relevance. 
7 THE COURT: We can do that out of the 
8 presence of the jury, see if it does have any 
9 relevance. It appeared to me somebody asked, what did 
10 you do after you got back. I reported to my P.O. But 
11 I'll allow you. We'll do that out of the presence of 
12 the jury just to make sure. 
13 MR. WALLENTINE: I intend to ask her the 
14 questions as to whether she had access to that storage 
15 shed prior to February of 1997. And, if not, why she 
16 didn't have access. 
17 MR. BEASLIN: She wasn't here. That's right. 
18 MR. WALLENTINE: Seems to me that if she's in 
19 prison that's a good alibi. 
20 MR. BEASLIN: That is a good alibi. 
21 MR. WALLENTINE: Not unless you get the --
22 THE COURT: We have had various statements 
23 that come in. And I think some of them were during 
24 your examination of the witnesses which talked about 
25 her being in prison. I think the daughter talked 
1 about it. And so that's kind of out. So I don't know 
2 that that's going to --
3 MR. WALLENTINE: They have opened the door. 
4 The door is open and the breeze is blowing. And it 
5 would be error for you not to let me ask those 
6 questions. And I intend to ask her about crimes 
7 involving dishonesty. 
8 THE COURT: Like what? 
9 MR. WALLENTINE: The shoplifting that she 
10 claims was a baby accidentally taking cigarettes while 
11 climbing a rack at Smith's. 
12 THE COURT: Anything else? 
13 MR. WALLENTINE: I have a certified copy of 
14 that conviction. A couple of forgeries where she's 
15 recently just admitted to forging some checks before 
16 Judge Anderson. Felony convictions. 
17 MR. BEASLIN: I don't think that would be 
18 admissible as to that. 
19 MR. WALLENTINE: Oh, find me a --
2 0 MR. BEASLIN;' The question was whether or not 
21 you had been convicted of a felony. She says, yes. 
22 That's it. 
23 MR. WALLENTINE: No. No. 
24 THE COURT: Thatf s the old rule. 
25 MR. BEASLIN: You can't go beyond that. 
1 MR. WALLENTINE: You bet you can. 
2 MR. BEASLIN: I don't think the new law 
3 didn't pass yet. 
4 MR. WALLENTINE: It's not a law. It's an 
5 order. It's a rule that the Utah Supreme Court, it 
6 was issued by the advisory committee and signed by 
7 Justice Zimmerman the same day. 
8 THE COURT: What's that? 
9 MR. WALLENTINE: The rule reversing Deporto. 
10 But independent of that you can still ask questions 
11 about crimes involving false statement or dishonesty. 
12 And you can't argue to me just because there is no 
13 basis to say that a forgery crime is not a false 
14 statement and a dishonesty. 
15 THE COURT: Under 404(b) this wouldn't come 
16 in. 
17 MR. WALLENTINE: 404(b) is not a rule of 
18 exclusion, it's a rule of inclusion. 
19 THE COURT: Yes. But it has to have some 
2 0 relevance. It has to be relevant to this crime. 
21 MR. WALLENTINE: Any conviction for a crime 
22 of dishonesty can be used to impeach. 
23 THE COURT: That would not be Rule 404(b) . 
24 I'll rule that it doesn't come in under 404(b). I 
25 have received the new ones. Look at 609. Ken's 
1 right. The Supreme Court changed that within the last 
2 two or three weeks. 609. 
3 MR. BEASLIN: This occurred back in# we are 
4 talking about a year ago. 
5 MR. WALLENTINE: Apply the rules of evidence 
6 as it exist at the time of trial. 
7 MR. BEASLIN: We are talking about March of 
8 '97. 
9 MR. WALLENTINE: True. 
10 THE COURT: Hefs correct. But I have ruled 
11 that 404(b) doesn't. 609 for the purpose of attacking 
12 credibility of witnesses other than the accused -- has 
13 been convicted of a crime - - i t says, "Evidence that 
14 an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be 
15 admitted if the court determines that the probative 
16 value of admitting this evidence outweighs its 
17 prejudicial effect to the accused, and the evidence 
18 that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall 
19 be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false 
2 0 statement regardless of the punishment." So what are 
21 the elements of forgery? 
22 MR. WALLENTINE: Judge, I appreciate that you 
23 want to look at the elements, but I cannot imagine 
24 that there is any way in the world that anyone can 
25 argue that a forgery, particularly a forgery of a 
1 check, is not both a false statement, because you are 
2 giving a false name and a dishonest statement, because 
3 you are representing that you have authority to take 
4 funds pursuant to that check when in fact you don't. 
5 THE COURT: I know the Supreme Court has 
6 found that theft isn't dishonest. 
7 MR. WALLENTINE: May not be, Judge. That's 
8 not what the case says. It says "may not be." 
9 THE COURT: You would have to give me facts 
10 to indicate. Can you tell me what the cite would be 
11 in 76-6. 
12 MR. WALLENTINE: Sure it's on the -- let's 
13 look at the conviction here. 76-6-501. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Beaslin, one of the elements 
15 of forgery is, well, it's in the alternative. That's 
16 the problem. You can either alter a writing without 
17 the authority or utter an altered writing. That's one 
18 way of doing it. Or if you make, complete, execute, 
19 issue, transfer, publish, or utter a writing so that 
20 the writing on the making, completion, execution, 
21 authentication, issuance, transference, publication or 
22 utterance purports to be the act of another. 
23 MR. WALLENTINE: Which is the conduct that 
24 she pled guilty to. 
25 THE COURT: How do we know that? 
-1 MR. WALLENTINE: "The elements of the crime 
2 with which I am charged are as follows." And that 
3 charge is contained right here in the affidavit signed 
4 by her. 
5 THE COURT: I think forgery requires a fraud. 
6 Looks to me like maybe this comes in, Mr. Beaslin. Do 
7 you have anything that you would like to say? We have 
8 looked at the statute. Hold that thought. Are you 
9 ready for me to rule on it? 
10 MR. BEASLIN: Probably, conceivably it would 
11 fit the statute, it looks like. 
12 THE COURT: Do you have any argument that I 
13 shouldn't? 
14 MR. BEASLIN: Not really. Not at this point. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Very briefly. 
16 MR. BEASLIN: Now, what are you proposing? 
17 What are you proposing to do with those two things? 
18 One thing or two things? 
19 MR. WALLENTINE: There is also a shoplifting 
20 conviction. 
21 THE COURT: No, not the shoplifting. And I 
22 don't want you to go into the parole officer unless we 
23 do it out of the presence of the jury and it has some 
24 relevance. 
25 MR. WALLENTINE: Okay. Underlying 
1 conviction, there is a robbery. An aggravated 
2 robbery. Would that not be a crime involving 
3 dishonesty? 
4 MR. BEASLIN: Not necessarily. 
5 THE COURT: Not necessarily. It's the intent 
6 but not necessarily a -- for the same reason theft 
7 isn't necessarily --
8 MR. WALLENTINE: I disagree. It's dishonest 
9 to take someone else's property away from them. And 
10 the theft, shoplifting. 
11 THE COURT: I agree with you. But, for the 
12 record, that's not what the appellate courts have told 
13 us. 
14 MR. WALLENTINE: And shoplifting, as she 
15 related it to us this morning, would constitute a 
16 crime involving dishonesty. Her story was that she 
17 lacked any criminal intent. Her story was that her 
18 baby climbed up the rack and took two cartons of 
19 cigarettes. 
2 0 THE COURT: Not letting you get into the 
21 robbery or the shoplifting. We'll take care of any 
22 issue as to a parole officer out of the presence of 
23 the jury. I highly doubt it has any relevance. And I 
24 will let you get into the forgery. I am a little bit 
25 worried about how you get into it. You just talk to 
1 her about it and get in and out of it. If you start 
2 to give undue influence to it, I think that has some 
3 403 issues that I don't think are appropriate. So 
4 tell them she's convicted of forgery, get her to admit 
5 it. You can talk to her, Mr. Beaslin, get her primed 
6 for the questions. 
7 MR. BEASLIN: Okay. 
8 THE COURT: Okay? 
9 (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.) 
10 (The following proceedings were 
11 held in chambers:) 
12 THE COURT: We are in chambers. Just to let 
13 you know. I asked my clerk to get a copy of the 
14 document that Mr. Wallentine gave me. And he gave me 
15 to understand that he's going to introduce the 
16 document concerning the plea. I have some real 
17 problems with that. I think that, Mr. Wallentine, 
18 what you are entitled to ask is if she's pled or found 
19 guilty and what she pled to and then not go into the 
20 facts. 
21 MR. WALLENTINE: Judge, I think that you are 
22 mistaken. And, unfortunately, I don't have advance 
23 notice of whether I think you are going to be mistaken 
24 and make a ruling to allow me to prepare to show you 
25 that you are mistaken. I do have a research file 
1 prepared down in my office on introducing prior 
2 convictions. And my recollection is that I am 
3 entitled to ask her about the prior conviction and 
4 entitled to ask her date of birth and identifying 
5 information and introduce the conviction itself into 
6 evidence before the jury. 
7 THE COURT: If she denies it, I think you are 
8 entitled to those kinds of things. But if she admits 
9 it, there isnft any need for that. 
10 MR. BEASLIN: Yes. 
11 MR. WALLENTINE: The proof under State vs. 
12 Petersen showing a prior conviction to discredit a 
13 witness may be shown by oral testimony of the witness* 
14 himself or by the court record of such conviction or a 
15 properly certified copy thereof. I think I am 
16 entitled to any means I can show, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: No. 
18 MR. WALLENTINE: Especially where it's a 
19 document that she's executed within days of this 
20 trial. And, by the way, on that same, on State vs. 
21 Ross, the Court of Appeals has found forgery to be a 
22 crime of dishonesty. 
23 THE COURT: I think you have already 
24 convinced me of that. It's just how far you can take 
25 these things. And if she admits to it that's it. You 
1 don't need to go into the facts, What did you do 
2 factually? It just shows that she's been convicted of 
3 a crime involving dishonesty, that's all. You may be 
4 able to get the elements of the offense in, but that 
5 wouldn't necessarily come from her. 
6 MR. WALLENTINE: Your Honor, she's signed an 
7 affidavit that has the elements listed. I don't see 
8 why I can't introduce the elements that way. 
9 THE COURT: Do you have any if he just asks? 
10 MR. BEASLIN: She'll admit that she pled to 
11 the forgery. That's all. 
12 THE COURT: I don't know if the jury 
13 understands what a forgery is. If they give the 
14 elements of the offense without going into the facts, 
15 I think that's probably fair. But they wouldn't 
16 necessarily know that. 
17 MR. BEASLIN: Who is going to testify to it? 
18 She didn't know the facts. She doesn't know what the 
19 elements are. 
20 THE COURT: She signed the affidavit. Why 
21 don't I give you a minute to go over the affidavit. 
22 MR. BEASLIN: She knows what the affidavit 
23 says. She's willing to admit she did plead guilty to 
24 the two charges. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
1 MR, BEASLIN: That's all. 
2 THE COURT: But somebody is going to have to 
3 get the elements in. 
4 AIR. BEASLIN: Who is going to do that? 
5 THE COURT: Either she does or --
6 MR. WALLENTINE: This document does right 
7 here. 
8 MR. BEASLIN: If you let that document in, 
9 that's all. 
10 THE COURT: Pardon me? 
11 MR. BEASLIN: I said, that's all the 
12 document. You can show the document, let the jury 
13 decide whether or not if the elements are in there, 
14 whatever it is. 
15 THE COURT: I hate to put in the affidavit in 
16 advance of a plea. That plea would be going a little 
17 bit too far. 
18 MR. WALLENTINE: I don't think there is any 
19 authority, Your Honor, for that position. 
2 0 THE COURT: I have a lot of discretion, I 
21 think, unfortunately, for, I guess, trial counsel. 
22 You know, to decide whether or not it's going too far 
23 under 403. And I just don't -- somehow or other we --
24 MR. BEASLIN: I don't feel comfortable about 
25 it either, other than the fact that she can say yes I 
1 pled guilty to a felony. That's all. 
2 THE COURT: You can ask her a leading 
3 question. Can you plead guilty and read the elements. 
4 And thatf s how --
5 MR. BEASLIN: As far as you go. 
6 THE COURT: And no further. Did she plead? 
7 Yes or no. When you pled guilty were these the 
8 elements? Yes or no. If she answers inappropriately, 
9 then you'll be given some opportunity to go further. 
10 You better spend some time with her and talk to her 
11 about that issue, Mr. Beaslin. 
12 MR. BEASLIN: I did tell her that. I did 
13 tell her, just answer yes for the elements, 
14 particularly to the fact that she pled. I'll go tell 
15 her as to the elements. Say, yes, thatfs what they 
16 are. That's all. 
17 MR. WALLENTINE: Two other things for the 
18 record, if you are through ruling on that and if you 
19 have noted my exception? 
20 THE COURT: Yes. 
21 MR. WALLENTINE: If Mr. King attempts to take 
22 the stand again, I am going to move for a mistrial 
23 based on the fact that he and Miss Hatch discussed the 
24 testimony during a break just a few moments ago. And, 
25 also, I would like to recall Sergeant Hatzidakis to 
1 discuss under Rule 608, the fact that hefs known Miss 
2 Hatch for many, many years in this community and is 
3 well aware of her general reputation for 
4 untruthfulness. 
5 MR. BEASLIN: I don't know anything about 
6 that. I don't know if he did or not. 
7 THE COURT: You can't bring that up unless 
8 they bring up --
9 MR. WALLENTINE: "The credibility of a 
10 witness may be attacked in the form of opinion or 
11 reputation subject to these limitations. The evidence 
12 may refer only to the character for truthfulness or 
13 untruthfulness, and evidence of truthful character is 
14 admissible only after the character of the witness for 
15 truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or 
16 reputation evidence or otherwise." 
17 THE COURT: What rule are you on? 
18 MR. WALLENTINE: 608(a). 
19 THE COURT: What page? 
20 MR. WALLENTINE: 603, Your Honor. I think I 
21 have the new on the '97 version. 
22 MR. BEASLIN: Now, do we know what they are 
23 talking about? 
24 THE COURT: I thought that there was an 
25 exclusion for defendants. 
1 AD?. WALLENTINE: I am not aware of any. Your 
2 Honor, I think, in fact, a couple of the cases were 
3 yours in 1990. Didn't you do in Duchesne County, 
4 State vs. Dan York? 
5 THE COURT: I don't think so. 
6 MR. WALLENTINE: With Loretta Purdy? When I 
7 was at the court of appeals? And State vs. Marilyn 
8 Hoyt. I am not aware of any exception for defendants, 
9 Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Beaslin, I guess it's -- I 
11 guess I have to rely upon you. It seemed to me that 
12 wasn't allowed except after the credibility had been 
13 challenged. 
14 MR. WALLENTINE: No. I see what you are 
15 thinking, Judge. You can't introduce testimony in for 
16 character for truthfulness until after character for 
17 untruthfulness has been established. 
18 MR. BEASLIN: Yes, untruthfulness. 
19 THE COURT: So why are you concerned about 
2 0 reputation then if it doesn't go to truthfulness? 
21 MR. WALLENTINE: No, it does. What I am 
22 saying is, I am entitled under 608 to bring in a 
23 witness who can testify, I have known this witness "X" 
24 number of years. I am familiar with her reputation in 
25 the community. Her reputation is she's an untruthful 
1 person. At that point, then the opposing side has an 
2 opportunity to bring in evidence of a reputation for 
3 untruthfulness. However, the reverse is not true. 
4 However, Mr. Beaslin could not proffer to the jury 
5 evidence of a general reputation for truthfulness 
6 until, until I had attacked her credibility. But I am 
7 entitled to throw the first salvo. And by taking the 
8 stand she has based her --
9 THE COURT: Just reading the rule, I think 
10 that appears to be right. 
11 MR. WALLENTINE: Your Honor, I don't mean to 
12 be cocky, but the two cases, State vs. York and State 
13 vs. Hoyt are cases that I was pretty heavily involved. 
14 York is a sex abuse trial. And I am almost 
15 100 percent sure you were the judge. It was tried in 
16 Duchesne County. The witness who was Loretta Purdy, 
17 who was the secretary over there. 
18 THE COURT: I wasn't the judge. But I think 
19 just reading the rule, you are correct, unless Mr. 
20 Beaslin can point out how some other rule or some 
21 other basis for keeping it --
22 MR. BEASLIN: I don't know, Your Honor. Just 
23 kind of hit me flat. I don't know. 
24 THE COURT: I can't help. Surprise is what 
25 happens. So you'll be allowed under Rule 608, 
1 apparently. Okay. Mr. Beaslin, if you can think of 
2 any other objections? 
3 (The following proceedings were held in 
4 open court with the jury present:) 
5 THE COURT: The record will indicate counsel 
6 and parties are present. Would you like to come back 
7 on the stand. Record will indicate the jury is 
8 present and now the witness is in place. 
9 Mr. Wallentine. 
10 MR. WALLENTINE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
11 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
12 BY MR. WALLENTINE: 
13 Q What is your date of birth? 
14 A 6/28/57. 
15 THE COURT: 1957? 
16 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
17 BY MR. WALLENTINE: 
18 0 Have you been convicted of any -- and we will 
19 limit this -- felony crimes involving dishonesty, 
2 0 making of false statements? 
21 MR. BEASLIN: I think it should be worded 
22 differently with reference to -- refer to the case. 
23 Refer to what she did. That's all* 
24 THE COURT: You rephrase that in terms of 
25 specific crimes, Mr. Wallentine? 
252 
1 BY MR. WALLENTINE: 
2 Q Sure. Have you ever been convicted of a 
3 crime involving facilitating a fraud or making, 
4 completing, executing, authenticating, issuing, 
5 transferring, publishing, or uttering any writing so 
6 that the making, completion, execution, 
7 authentication, issuance, transference, publication or 
8 utterance purported to be the act of another, 
9 specifically, to wit, a number of bank checks issued 
10 on another person's account? 
11 A Yes. I plead guilty on two counts, forgery. 
12 0 And those are felony forgeries, and that was 
13 within the last few days? Few weeks? 
14 A About a week ago, I think. 
15 MR. WALLENTINE: I would move for admission 
16 of Exhibit 3, Your Honor, which the court's examined 
17 in chambers and Mr. Beaslin. 
18 MR. BEASLIN: No objection. 
19 MR. WALLENTINE: Has signed and affixed his 
2 0 signature to. 
21 THE COURT: You have no objection, Mr. 
22 Beaslin? 
23 MR. BEASLIN: No, Your Honor. It's a matter 
24 of record. 
25 THE COURT: Exhibit No. 3 will be received. 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
KANDICE HATCH, 
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Judge John R. Anderson 
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This matter having come on regularly before this Court for 
sentencing on the 11th day of August, 1998, the Honorable John R. 
Anderson presiding. The State being represented by JoAnn B. 
Stringham, Uintah County Attorney, and the Defendant being 
personally present and represented by counsel, John C. Beaslin. 
The defendant having been convicted of or having plead guilty 
to two counts of FORGERY, Third Degree felonies, in violation of 
Section 76-6-501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The Court, having received a Pre-Sentence Investigation 
Report from the Department of Corrections, having reviewed the 
same, the Defendant, having previously been furnished the said Pre-
sentence Investigation Report, admitted there were no inaccuracies 
> / ^ 
or was furnished the opportunity to have a hearing to challenge any 
claimed inaccuracies, and no legal reason having been shown why 
judgment and sentencing should not be pronounced, entered a 
Judgment as follows: 
1. That the Defendant is hereby sentenced on Count I, 
FORGERY, a Third Degree Felony, to serve zero (0) to Five (5) years 
in the Utah State Prison. 
2. That the Defendant is sentenced on Count II, FORGERY, a 
Third Degree Felony, to serve zero (0) to Five (5) years in the 
Utah State Prison. 
3. That these prison terms be served concurrent with each 
other and with Judge Payne's burglary charge, Case No. 971800246. 
4. That the Defendant pay restitution in the total amount of 
ONE THOUSAND FORTY AND NO/100 DOLLAR ($1,040.00) . Said restitution 
should be paid to the Eighth Judicial District Court and reimbursed 
to the victims as follows: 
a. NINE HUNDRED SIXTY DOLLARS ($960.00) payable to 
Davis IGA, 575 West Main, Vernal, Utah 84078. 
b. EIGHTY DOLLARS ($80.00) payable to Smith's Food 
King, 1080 West Highway 40, Vernal, Utah 84078. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That the Defendant is forthwith remanded to the custody of the 
Uintah County Sheriff for transportation to the Utah State Prison 
and execution of the sentence given herein. 
DATED this >/ day of August, 1 
AJOHN R. ANDERSON 
District Court Judge 
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Addendum C 
1 A Almost 20, yes, sir. 
2 Q Now, I am not going to ask you to do any 
3 scientific analysis for us. I would like to ask you a 
4 straight forward question. Do you find when you speak 
5 to people, when you determine later by the facts to be 
6 truthful, about their story being consistent? 
7 A Yes. 
8 0 So what does it suggest to you when you get a 
9 an a, b, or c, a gut to tell for somebody that 
10 somebody gave it to me then somebody gave it, pawn it 
11 store it for you? 
12 THE COURT: Just a minute. It's asking him 
13 to evaluate on and comment on the truthfulness of the 
14 statement. He's not qualified to do that. 
15 MR. BEASLIN: I agree. 
16 BY MR. WALLENTINE: 
17 Q Would you find it to be an indicator of 
18 accuracy and veracity to have inconsistent statements 
19 offered to you? 
20 A I am sorry. One more time. 
21 0 Would you find it -- would it suggest to you 
22 that a person is being truthful when they gave you 
23 inconsistent statements? 
24 A I would not believe --
25 MR. BEASLIN: I still object. 
1 THE COURT: Sustained. 
2 MR. BEASLIN: Form of the question, Your 
3 Honor. 
4 THE COURT: He's not going to be qualified to 
5 say whether or not this --
6 MR. WALLENTINE: I am asking not as an 
7 expert. I thought I made that plain in the 
8 foundation. But just in the thousands of interviews, 
9 just when people who change their story is likely to 
10 be truthful or not truthful. 
11 THE COURT: He's not qualified. Sorry. 
12 THE WITNESS: I understand. 
13 B7 MR. WALLENTINE: 
14 Q In this case, however, you were given 
15 inconsistent statements; is that true? 
16 A I was given inconsistent stories as to this 
17 particular case. 
18 MR. WALLENTINE: Thank you. 
19 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
2 0 BY MR. BEASLIN: 
21 Q Sergeant Hatzidakis, about when did you get 
22 involved in it after the March 15th determination that 
23 the storage unit had been broken into? 
24 A I want to say the case was assigned to me on 
25 April 8th. And I spent between the 8th and the 24th 
Addendum D 
i 
1 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 
2 was received into evidence.) 
3 BY MR. WALLENTINE: 
4 0 How long have you lived in this community? 
5 A Urn, about 17 years. 
6 Q And are you familiar with Sergeant 
7 Hatzidakis? 
8 A Yeah. 
9 0 I see you place some particular emphasis on 
10 that. Why is that? 
11 A He came to the college parking lot and 
12 harassed me one time about what this girl Francis said 
13 about me. And when I went to court, I won. 
14 Q Have you dealt with him on other occasions? 
15 A No. 
16 0 Never? 
17 A Just this saddle thing. 
18 Q So there are only two times. Both times you 
19 were accused of a crime that you have dealt with him; 
20 is that correct? 
21 A Yeah. 
22 Q So if I were to introduce evidence of other 
23 times when you dealt with him where you were not 
24 actually arrested and taken into custody, you wouldn't 
25 have any recollection of those times? 
1 A Probably not because I have only done two 
2 dealings with him. 
3 Q And you are quite certain? 
4 A That I can remember. 
5 Q And you are quite certain of that? 
6 A I am pretty sure. That's only two times I 
7 can remember. 
8 Q Before the break you testified that you were 
9 angry with Mr. Wilson over, and you said abandoning 
10 your children and exposing them being picked up by 
11 Social Services; is that correct? 
12 A No, sir. That's not how I said it. 
13 0 What!s not correct? 
14 A I didn't say I was angry. I said I was 
15 really upset and it really hurt me. And he's not 
16 the -- I did not state he exposed my children to 
17 Social Service. 
18 0 Had you dealt with Social Services before? 
19 A Yes, I have. 
20 Q With respect to having your children taken 
21 away? 
22 A No, sir. 
23 Q Why did you go to Craig, Colorado at the time 
24 you picked up the strawberry planter? 
25 A I went down there and asked Bill if I could 
1 have my stuff back. 
2 Q Have you ever pawned anything? 
3 A Oh, yeah. 
4 Q On many occasions? 
5 A Yeah. 
6 Q Have you ever pawned anything at any time at 
7 Jiffy Pawn? 
8 A Sure. I got stuff in there right now. 
9 Q So you are familiar with the procedure? 
10 A Yes, sir. 
11 Q How many times have you met with Mr. Beaslin 
12 to discuss your story here today? 
13 A Probably, about four or five times or more. 
14 Q And have you had just as many discussions 
15 about what you would say here with your other 
16 daughters? 
17 A Not really. Very depressing subject to talk 
18 and discuss about, to tell you the truth. 
19 0 You heard Mr. King come in and testify a 
20 little bit earlier; is that correct? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Did you listen to what he had to say? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Did you hear him list a number of people that 
25 he said provided him a story? 
1 A Yes. 
2 Q Were you one of those people who helped him 
3 out? 
4 A Yes. 
5 MR. WALLENTINE: Thank you. 
6 THE COURT: He asked where the saddle came 
7 from. Mr. Beaslin. 
8 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
9 BY MR. BEASLIN: 
10 0 Just a couple of questions. With reference 
11 when you took the saddle down there at one time, you 
12 intended to sell it, you didn't intend to pawn it, did 
13 you? 
14 A No, I did not intend to pawn it. 
15 Q All you wanted was to get the money for it 
16 and that was it? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q When you talked to Bill, he told you to do 
19 what you wanted with it? 
20 A Yes. But he told me I could go down and sell 
21 it, and it would reimburse a lot more than what it 
22 did. 
23 0 And I think, and I believe Mr. Wallentine --
24 you answered the question, you had gone over to Craig 
25 in an effort to try and obtain some of the things 
1 back, what you said he had taken of yours; is that 
2 correct? 
3 A Yes. Because his nephew said his stuff was 
4 at his apartment. He seen it there. 
5 Q Which is more than the vacuum, the planter, 
6 and the freezer? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Separate items that you felt he owed you he 
9 had taken and hadn't returned? 
10 A Yes. A lot of stuff. 
11 MR. BEASLIN: Okay. I believe that's all. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Wallentine? 
13 MR. WALLENTINE: No. 
14 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, do you have 
15 any questions of this witness? Okay. This will be 
16 marked as number two. Record indicate no objections. 
17 Would you handle that, Mr. Wallentine? 
18 BY MR. WALLENTINE: 
19 0 Certainly. Tell us the specific date that 
20 Mr. Wilson showed up at your trailer and brought you 
21 this saddle. 
22 A Approximately, about March 14th, I am pretty 
23 sure. Fourteenth or 15th. 
24 MR. BEASLIN: That's fine. 
25 THE COURT: All right. Gentlemen, any other 
1 questions? 
2 MR. BEASLIN: I believe thatfs all we have, 
3 Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 
5 any other questions? 
6 May step down. 
7 MR. BEASLIN: I believe thatfs all we have, 
8 Your Honor. We rest. 
9 THE COURT: Defense rests. Mr. Wallentine, 
10 any rebuttal? 
11 MR. WALLENTINE: Sergeant Hatzidakis. 
12 SERGEANT STEVE HATZIDAKIS, 
13 called by the Plaintiff, having been duly 
14 sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
15 REBUTTAL EXAMINATION 
16 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
17 BY MR. WALLENTINE: 
18 0 Sergeant, is it accurate for me to state that 
19 before becoming employed at the sheriff's office after 
2 0 Sheriff Hawkins was elected that you also worked at 
21 Vernal City Police Department? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Worked there for many years; is that correct? 
24 A I have been in Vernal 12 years, all in law 
2 5 enforcement. 
1 0 And with that city you also had been promoted 
2 several times and, at one point, were in the patrol 
3 division; is that correct? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Sergeant Hatzidakis, you just heard the 
6 defendant testify that she's only dealt with you on 
7 two occasions over those 12 years that you have been 
8 here in town. Would you please tell the jury whether 
9 thatfs accurate or not? 
10 A Very inaccurate. 
11 Q Very inaccurate? 
12 A Very inaccurate. 
13 0 In fact, if we multiplied that perhaps by a 
14 factor of 10, even more, would that be accurate if you 
15 can have, if you have a specific recollection? 
16 A Let's just say I have dealt with her 
17 numerous, numerous times. 
18 0 But without disclosing --
19 A Okay. 
20 0 without disclosing any of the specifics of 
21 those particular times, and that's been over the 
22 entire 12 years? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Without disclosing any of the specifics, 
25 Sergeant Hatzidakis, would you be able to tell the 
1 jury whether the defendant has a reputation in this 
2 community for truthfulness or untruthfulness? 
3 A Yes. 
4 MR. BEASLIN: I think I would object to that, 
5 Your Honor, for the record with reference to his 
6 knowledge, as to whether or not he is specifically 
7 going into any particular area that would be 
8 necessarily helpful to this jury, I don't think, with 
9 reference to that without something more than just the 
10 fact that they had had meetings or confrontations or 
11 whatever for whatever reason. 
12 MR. WALLENTINE: Your Honor, there is nothing 
13 I would like more than to ask specific instances. But 
14 the Rule 608(a) we have just discussed in chambers, I 
15 have limited my question exactly and, in fact, Your 
16 Honor, I have tracked the language of the rule itself. 
17 THE COURT: We did discuss that. And we 
18 don't need to bore the jury with those things. Maybe 
19 it's good that they know we were working and not 
2 0 playing. 
21 MR. WALLENTINE: I am not sure it was boring, 
22 Judge. 
23 THE COURT: I am going to sustain the 
24 objection on this basis, that the issue is his 
25 knowledge of the witness1 reputation in the community, 
1 not among law enforcement, but in the community at 
2 large. You ask the proper question. 
3 MR. WALLENTINE: I am sorry. That was the 
4 question I intended to ask. 
5 BY MR. WALLENTINE: 
6 Q Whether in the course of your dealings, not 
7 only with your officers, but other people that have 
8 been, and again without disclosing circumstances, 
9 other people who have been involved in those 
10 situations with the defendant? 
11 MR. BEASLIN: I object to that. 
12 THE COURT: Sustained. The issue of 
13 Mr. Wallentine is not with respect to any particular 
14 area, investigations or non-investigations, just is he 
15 familiar with the reputation of this person's --
16 excuse me -- is he familiar with this person's 
17 reputation in the community with respect to honesty. 
18 That's all. 
19 MR. WALLENTINE: What I am trying to do is 
20 lay the foundation for his ability to give that. 
21 THE COURT: But it doesn't relate to 
22 investigations at all. See, leave that out of your 
23 question, I think we'll be all right. 
24 BY MR. WALLENTINE: 
25 0 Are you aware of whether or not the defendant 
1 has a reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness? 
2 A Yes, 
3 Q What is that reputation? 
4 MR. BEASLIN: I think I object on the same 
5 basis. I still don't think there is a proper 
6 foundation with reference to the community at large. 
7 THE COURT: Overruled. I think that 
8 thatfs -- you can cross-examine him on the issue. 
9 Overruled. 
LO BY MR. WALLENTINE: 
LI 0 What is her reputation? 
L2 A I think it would be more towards the 
13 untruthfulness or deceptive. 
L4 0 Having said that, Sergeant Hatzidakis --
L5 A Yes. 
L6 Q --do you approach every situation with an 
L7 open mind so that your past dealings with someone 
L8 don't characterization, color your interviews and 
L9 force you to prejudge their guilt or innocence? 
20 A I do. 
21 MR. WALLENTINE: Thank you. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Beaslin? 
23 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
24 BY MR. BEASLIN: 
25 Q Sergeant Hatzidakis, you don't really have a 
1 feel for the pulse of the community as such as an 
2 officer and so forth wherein you can make those kinds 
3 of statements about a person based upon the general 
4 reputation for a individual in the community, can you? 
5 MR. WALLENTINE: Objection. The ruling does 
6 not provide a pulse on the community. Provides 
7 whether a person has dealt with a witness or a 
8 defendant and whether through those dealings is able 
9 to determine whether there is a reputation, not 
10 whether the witness is aware of the entire community's 
11 view of her truthfulness or untruthfulness. 
12 MR. BEASLIN: The other question. 
13 THE COURT: Just a minute, Mr. Wallentine. I 
14 think that he can go into whether or not he is 
15 familiar with the reputation of the community. 
16 Overruled. 
17 BY MR. BEASLIN: 
18 0 The question is whether or not, do you, is it 
19 based upon your individual thought about that, or does 
2 0 it relate to others you have talked to, been close to, 
21 talked about, or whatever, as relates to this 
22 defendant? Is it solely based upon your personal 
23 contact with Miss Hatch with reference to your serving 
24 as a cop or whatever. 
25 A It's been a professional situation. I mean 
1 as a law enforcement officer. And it's with other 
2 people. 
3 Q So it isn't necessarily --
4 A It's not law enforcement specific. It's the 
5 community or people within the community. 
6 0 Okay. And that's as far as you can go with 
7 reference to saying that? 
8 A Sure. 
9 MR. BEASLIN: I believe that's all. 
10 THE COURT: Anything further? 
11 MR. WALLENTINE: No. 
12 THE COURT: Jury have any questions on that? 
13 You may step down, then. 
14 MR. WALLENTINE: Bill Wilson. 
15 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, one of the 
16 exhibits that has been spoken about is Exhibit No. 3. 
17 I have that in my hand. And that's been actually 
18 received into evidence. What it is, is an affidavit 
19 of defendant in advance of a plea of guilty and 
2 0 agreement. As the evidence has indicated, this was 
21 executed within the last recent period of time. 
22 Actually, on the 25th of February 1998, wherein Miss 
23 Hatch pled guilty to two forgery offenses. This has 
24 other things in it that don't have anything to do with 
25 this case. So I am just going to give you that 
1 information. She's admitted to that. And rather than 
2 to give you this exhibit to go into the jury room, 
3 I'll just indicate that if you were to review this, 
4 what you would find that would be relevant was the 
5 information I just gave you. 
6 That will be withheld from the jury. 
7 You may proceed. 
8 BILL WILSON, 
9 called by the Plaintiff, having been duly 
10 sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
11 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 By MR. WALLENTINE: 
13 0 Mr. Wilson, you are still under oath. You 
14 were given an instruction by the judge earlier to not 
15 discuss your testimony with anyone after you were 
16 sworn as a witness. Do you remember that? 
17 A Correct. 
18 Q Did you follow that instruction, sir? 
19 A I have talked to you. 
20 Q You havenft talked to any of the witnesses, 
21 haven't talked to any of the jurors? 
22 A Not about the case, no. 
23 THE COURT: Clarify that. 
24 THE WITNESS: No. I have talked to my son 
25 out here in the hallway, and he's not part of the 
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1 convicted felon. Not convicted of something that's 
2 irrelevant, but something that tells you what kind of 
3 person she is. Whether indeed Sergeant Hatzidakis is 
4 right. 
5 Now, she says shefs only dealt with him twice 
6 over 12 years that he's been in town. He told you 
7 many, many, many occasions he's dealt with her, her 
8 and other people. And he's able to tell you what her 
9 reputation is. And that was his opinion. That's all. 
10 That's all any of us can give. He gave you an opinion 
11 after dealing with her. And he listened to other 
12 people that was dealing with her that she has a 
13 reputation in town for untruthfulness. But beyond 
14 that you don't just have his opinion, you have a 
15 document of this court, a conviction of this court, 
16 Eighth District Court, in which on two occasions, at 
17 least, the defendant stands convicted before you of a 
18 crime of dishonesty. So that's what it comes down to. 
19 And you know it's not really so complex. Your task is 
20 to go back and weigh the stories, which one's true and 
21 which one's not. Thank you. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Beaslin. 
23 MR. BEASLIN: May it please the court, 
24 Mr. Wallentine, ladies and gentlemen of the jury: As 
25 you can tell, and as I mentioned to you in my opening 
Addendum F 
1 So the state is presenting to you today a 
2 story, Bill Williams1 storage shed being broken into, 
3 the burglary, by force, property destroyed, saddle 
4 taken out of it, saddle taken down to Jiffy Pawn. But 
5 you see not just Bill's the victim here, not just 
6 Grace is the victim here. Jiffy Pawn. They had to 
7 pay out money. They are out 50 bucks. May not seem 
8 much to you. But 50 bucks here, 50 bucks there, it 
9 adds up pretty quick. They are deceived into giving 
10 $50 because the defendant says, I have the right to 
11 sell this. I am the legal owner of said property. 
12 Signs her name below. Leaves her fingerprint there. 
13 So based on her representation, her deception, Jiffy 
14 Pawn gives up $50, which they still donft have back. 
15 And after the case is over, the best thing 
16 here today is, I am going to be able to give Grace her 
17 saddle back. Jiffy Pawn will be out. So I would like 
i8 you to listen carefully to what Deputy Byron has to 
19 say to you. 
20 Bill Wilson. Grace Sharp. Jason Dansie. 
21 He's the fellow -- his sister-in-law was here 
22 earlier -- he's the fellow who also signed this and 
23 witnessed it at Jiffy Pawn Shop. And then we'll also 
24 ask you to listen to Sergeant Hatzidakis as he tells 
25 you what happened when he went to confront the 
1 defendant and how her story shifted and changed to 
2 suit what might be most convenient, and how he didnft 
3 think he could believe her simply because she was 
4 telling a shifting story. We'll see what she has to 
5 say. I'll ask you to listen carefully to her as well. 
6 And I'll ask you to listen carefully as I present to 
7 her the records of her past, her most recent past, her 
8 convictions wherein she admitted, finally, to the 
9 court that she was lying about other things. And at 
10 the end of the day you have one job here. You'll get 
11 some legal instructions. And, we're lawyers. We'll 
12 give you a bunch of papers. That's what we do. And 
13 it will explain the law from here to there. But you 
14 are here to do one thing, and that's to find the 
15 truth. And the truth is this defendant got mad, she 
16 tore up Bill Wilson's storage shed, busted up his 
17 entertainment center. She took the saddle. He made a 
18 fatal mistake, by darn. He left her and went back to 
19 his buddy, his ex-wife. Saddle went down to Jiffy 
2 0 Pawn. Jiffy Pawn made out the money. They are out 
21 the money. Grace is out the saddle. And the 
22 defendant is here today to answer for it. That's why 
23 you are here, is to tell us what the truth is. Thank 
24 you. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wallentine. Mr. 
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1 opportunity to make a telephone call. In fact, we are 
2 going to -- we may take opening statements before we 
3 go to lunch. But the first thing that will happen is 
4 you can go and call, tell your work, tell your husband 
5 or wife, whoever else needs to know, you can tell them 
6 that you'll be here and you'll be a juror in this 
7 case. Then we'll have an opening statement by each 
8 party. 
9 Now, the opening statements that are given 
10 are so that you can understand, from the time that the 
11 case starts, about what the case is about. It gives 
12 you an overview of the case. The attorneys present 
13 the opening statement. What the attorneys say during 
14 opening statement, during final argument, and during 
15 all of the process of trial, their statements are not 
16 evidence. They are not placed under oath. They are 
17 not examined and cross-examined. And so you are to 
18 take those statements for your use and consideration, 
19 but you shouldn't consider their statements as being 
20 evidence. And if you are chosen to be a juror and you 
21 get into the jury room and you are deliberating this 
22 matter, if the attorneys have said something as to 
23 what happened, and you remember it differently, you go 
24 according to your memory. And, of course, you'll be 
25 given the opportunity to speak with the other members 
1 of the jury concerning those issues. 
2 After the opening statement, each party will 
3 be given an opportunity to present evidence. First 
4 the state will be given the opportunity. They will 
5 call their witnesses. As each witness is called, the 
6 other side will be given an opportunity to 
7 cross-examine the witnesses which have been called. 
8 After that process has been taken care of or, in fact, 
9 during that process, there may be certain items of 
10 physical evidence such as documents or other things 
11 that are submitted for the jury's consideration as 
12 evidence. 
13 At the conclusion of all the evidence, the 
14 court will instruct you as to the law in this case. 
15 And I talked to you about that a little bit in the 
16 past. What that means is that when you go into the 
17 jury room, you'll be given a written packet of jury 
18 instructions which will contain the law which will 
19 guide you during your jury deliberations. As I give 
20 the law to you, you need to remember that you'll be 
21 given that in writing. You'll be able to take that 
22 into the jury room. 
23 Again, I'll remind you that it is your 
24 obligation to follow the law as I give it to you 
25 regardless of what you believe the law is or ought to 
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1 be. After you are instructed as to the law, the 
2 attorneys will be given a final opportunity to speak 
3 with you. That is referred to as the argument phase 
4 of the trial. At that time, they will be looking at 
5 what the law is, looking at what the facts are in the 
6 case, and trying to convince you as to a particular 
7 result based upon the law and the facts in this case. 
8 Again, I'll remind you that what they say in this 
9 matter is not evidence. 
10 Now, let me introduce you. You have been 
11 introduced to everybody except I think these three or 
12 four people here. Let me first introduce you to 
13 Mr. McKee. He is the bailiff in the court. He has 
14 certain responsibilities with respect to the court. 
15 One is to maintain order and security within the 
16 courtroom. He, however, has a particular 
17 responsibility with respect to the jury. He will take 
18 the jury to and from the courtroom as you go into the 
19 jury room. And if you need to- communicate with the 
2 0 court, you do that through the bailiff. And you do it 
21 in writing. Just don't speak to him. You write it 
22 down, and he brings whatever you have written down to 
23 the court. And then I consider that with the 
24 attorneys. 
25 Mrs. Teeguarden is my court clerk. She is to 
Addendum H 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER ).Q 
Any statement of counsel made during the course of the trial or during 
argument which is not supported by the evidence is to be wholly disregarded. 
